T.J I would have to agree with you---that Churchill was far from a beloved leader inside Britain—as he was probably viewed from afar.--- hence his quick and humiliating landslide defeat at the ballot box,--never to return as soon as the war was over, in what was apt named “The Khaki Election” delayed so all the troops---who overwhelmingly wanted him out-- votes could counted…..he may be more remembered by some older British workers by his tactics of the use of troops to break up strikes and hunger marches before the war.
I can’t fully agree with you on some other views--- However.
Britain also lent a large amount from Canada during the war as did so many other countries--- something you do not hear the Canadians get many Kudos’s for. Britain was the only country to pay back its war debt, which took it to 2007 to achieve, all other countries debts war debts were declared void by Jimmy Carter--*1stars & stripes
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Think you’ve waited a long time for an old friend to pay back a loan? Try 60 years. That’s how long it took the United Kingdom to pay off the nearly $5 billion — or roughly $50 billion in today’s money— it borrowed from the U.S. at the conclusion of World War II. The loan made news recently when Britain made its final $83 million payment on Dec. 29. All told, Britain made 50 installments — it deferred payments several times in years of economic hardship— for a total of $7.5 billion, including interest, according
to Her Majesty’s Treasury. “We finally honor in full our commitments to the U.S. and Canada for the support they gave us 60 years ago,”
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http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/econo ... 070110.pdfBlitzThe British side of the story is that Germany first broke this agreement, Germany had already Bombed Warsaw---but Britain accepted there explanation that this was a Fortified Military city.
But this was in no way the case in Rotterdam.
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The United Kingdom's policy was formulated on 31 August 1939: if Germany initiated unrestricted air action, the United Kingdom "should attack objectives vital to Germany's war effort, and in particular her oil resources". If Germany confined attacks to purely military targets, the RAF should "launch an attack on the German fleet at Wilhelmshaven" and "attack warships at sea when found within range".[22] [b]The government communicated to their French allies the intention "not to initiate air action which might involve the risk of civilian casualties"[/b][23]
While it was acknowledged bombing Germany would cause civilian casualties, [b]the British government renounced deliberate bombing of civilian property, outside combat zones, as a military tactic[/b].[24] The British abandoned this policy on 15 May 1940, one day after the Rotterdam Blitz, when the RAF was given permission to attack targets in the Ruhr, including oil plants and other civilian industrial targets which aided the German war effort, such as blast furnaces that at night were self-illuminating. The first RAF raid on the interior of Germany took place on the night of 15/16 May 1940.[25] *2 Wiki
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_ ... rld_War_II I think the greatest civilian deaths by bombing were the fire bombs over Japan --- this is covered by Robert S. McNamara –in an excellent Book and film/DVD “The Fog of War” he was employed at that time to help maximize the affect of bombing over Japan---this was done by Firebombing—in a typical Asian country all houses made of wood and very close to each other--- the Deaths from the Firebombing far exceeded the A-Bomb Casualties, and in a frank interview he does state that if “we” had lost the war, then for this act alone we would have certainly been tried for war crimes.
In the book/DVD He apologies ---and recognizes many of the mistakes made when he was Secretary of state. Before being sacked for telling Pres Johnson –America could not win the war in Vietnam.
He lists the 11 reasons in retrospect on that war, that to me have some eerie echoes of a current conflict.
1. We misjudged then — and we have since — the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries … and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.
2. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience … We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.
3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values.
4. Our judgments of friend and foe, alike, reflected our profound[ ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders.
5. We failed then — and have since — to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces, and doctrine.
6. We failed, as well, to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.
7.We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale military involvement … before we initiated the action
8. After the action got under way, and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course … we did not fully explain what was happening, and why we were doing what we did.
9. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Our judgment of what is in another people's or country's best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our image or as we choose.
10. We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action … should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.
11. We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions … At times, we may have to live with an imperfect, untidy world